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Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests:
Regulatory Competition and Cooperation
in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law
Frederick Tung'
INTRODUCTION
Generally speaking, nations regulate on a territorial basis. Each state regulates
transactions and entities within its territory. Regulatory competition proponents are
generally suspicious of the ability of government to regulate efficiently, asserting that
regulatory regimes tend to be captured by private interests that manipulate regulation
in order to redistribute wealth in their direction. Ideally for regulatory competition
advocates, allowing regulated entities to choose the regulatory regime that will govern
their affairs-"private choice"-will generate more efficient regulation. Private choice
breaks the "regulatory monopolies" enjoyed by regulators under the dominant
territorial approach. In the areas of corporate, securities, and bankruptcy law, it forces
governments and their regulators to compete to offer regulation that firms and their
investors prefer. In the face of private choice, the argument goes, regulators will
compete, since regulatory bureaucracies wish above all else to augment their own
prestige. They do this by maximizing the number of firms and transactions under
their regulatory purview.
Among scholars of international regulatory reform, harmonization is often
viewed as the polar opposite-the nemesis-of competition.2 While competition calls
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. AB 1983, Cornell;JD 1987, Harvard.
E-mail: tungf@usfca.edu; web: <www.usfca.edu/law/tung>. For helpful comments and suggestions,
I owe thanks to Andrew Guzman and Todd Zywicki.
1. Unless the context otherwise implies, I use the term "regulator" generically, to refer to a government
actor who makes or enforces legal rules.
2. See, for example, Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
Theoretical Inquiries L 387, 396 (2001) ('The potential need for regulatory diversity as a
justification for facilitating securities regulation competition, as is true of most arguments in support
of competition, is also an argument against regulators' top-down efforts to effect international
regulatory harmonization").
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for a diversity of regulatory regimes promulgated by rivalrous lawgivers from various
jurisdictions, each striving to satisfy consumer demand in a global market for law,
harmonization implies standardization of substantive rules across multiple
jurisdictions. Far from putting competitive pressure on regulators, according to this
view, harmonization merely extends across national borders the reach of regulators'
stodgy monopolies.'
Harmonization and competition, however, may not necessarily be antipodal in
all contexts. Far from incompatible, competition and harmonization may be
complements in some circumstances. In particular, competition requires
harmonization on choice of law. Competition requires states to allow private actors
implicitly or explicitly to opt out of territorial regulation. A decision to exit must be
respected in order for competition to emerge. From a political economy perspective,
some degree of harmonization of substantive rules may also facilitate competition.
Establishing a common baseline-a set of minimum requirements-among states
may enable political deals that allow competition as to remaining aspects in an area of
regulation.
In this article, I discuss regulatory competition in the related areas of corporate,
securities, and bankruptcy law. As all of these areas address firms' relations with
investors, they share an affinity that offers a natural focus of inquiry. I contrast two
different forms that regulatory competition may take. The first is private choice, or
what I call "direct competition." In this arrangement, firms are free to elect the
regulatory regime that will govern their affairs, regardless of the location of a firm's
assets, personnel, registered office, or transactions. The paradigmatic example is
corporate charter competition among US states. The second form of competition I
refer to as the "regulatory passport" arrangement, which has also been variously
described as "mutual recognition" and "reciprocity."A In this scenario, states agree to
recognize the extraterritorial reach of firms' home country regulatory regimes,
forswearing territorial regulation by host countries.
Harmonization over choice of law rules is necessary for both these forms-
facilitating the competition that results. In the case of direct competition, states'
agreed choice of law rule is to defer to each firm's private choice of regulation. In the
3. See Enrico Colombatto and Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic
Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 Cardozo L Rev 925, 951-53 (1996) (characterizing
SEC efforts at international coordination of insider trading enforcement as attempt to preserve its
own authority).
4. See Howell E. Jackson and Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets:
Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part 1, 56 Bus Law 653, 662 (2001) (describing EU securities
regulatory scheme of mutual recognition as "passport" system); Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of
Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 L & Contemp Probs 71, 80 (2001) ("mutual recognition');
Stephen J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of
Securities Regulation, 71 S Cal L Rev 903, 918 (1998) ("normal reciprocity").
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case of the regulatory passport, states agree to apply each firm's home country law. In
addition, a regulatory passport system typically involves some harmonization of
substantive rules as a condition to allowing extraterritorial effect to home country
regulation.
These two forms of regulatory competition are distinguishable along several
dimensions, however, a point that is sometimes obscured. Some analysts have tended
to lump regulatory passport arrangements together with direct competition when
discussing the promise and prospects of regulatory competition generally. Regulatory
passport arrangements appear to be much more common than instances of direct
competition, and some seem fond of characterizing passport systems as a step
"toward" direct competition.' Others do distinguish the two forms, recognizing limits
to particular passport arrangements in terms of firm mobility and competitive
pressure on regulators.6 In this article, I offer a general discussion of the competitive
promise of regulatory passports, contrasting the ideal type with direct competition
and with the regulatory passport arrangements that exist. Throughout the discussion,
in keeping with the theme of this symposium on exploring the need for international
harmonization, I highlight the role that harmonization plays in enabling competition.
Care should be taken not to conflate direct competition with regulatory
passports. Not only are the competitive effects very different, but the politics are as
well. Structurally, direct competition would likely be far more effective than a
regulatory passport system at placing competitive pressures on lawmakers. However,
questions exist concerning the prospects for achieving the choice of law harmonization
necessary for direct competition, which must overcome entrenched interests of
regulators and their important constituents. I suggest these political obstacles are
likely to prevent development of the requisite choice of law cooperation. Direct
competition among US states over corporate charters may be a peculiarity of the US
federal system. Similar political considerations suggest that regulatory passport
systems are more likely to emerge. Even with regulatory passports, though, political
considerations in the negotiation and implementation of such arrangements will tend
to blunt the competitive pressures meant to be focused on national regulators.
5. See Jackson and Pan, 56 Bus Law at 663 (cited in note 4) ("The principle of mutual recognition has
been associated with regulatory competition since its inception."); Howell E. Jackson, Centralization,
Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L 649, 658 (2001)
(referring to US-Canadian Multijurisdicrional Disclosure System (MJDS) as "Delawarizationf' of
US securities laws); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 Yale LJ 2359, 2420 (1998) (relying on MJDS as "precedent" for private choice proposal).
6. See Choi and Guzman, 71 S Cal L Rev at 920 (cited in note 4) (noting theoretical possibility for
competitive pressure from US-Canadian Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) and other
reciprocity arrangements, but also recognizing drawbacks); Scott, 63 L & Contemp Probs at 81-85
(cited in note 4) (critiquing MJDS and EU mutual recognition for securities offerings).
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In part I, I describe direct competition and obstacles to its achievement. In
particular, the assumed pursuit of private interests by regulators-so central to the
case for regulatory competition-will likely drive regulators to block the emergence of
direct competition. Part II discusses the regulatory passport arrangement. It first
describes in ideal terms the more indirect competition offered by regulatory passport
systems. It then discusses private interests and other factors that may often surface to
blunt competitive pressures. As part of this analysis, part II also contrasts passport
systems with direct competition. Part III turns to the political economy of regulatory
passports, offering a private interest explanation for their popularity as compared to
private choice. Throughout the analysis, I accept the basic public choice assumptions
favored by regulatory competition proponents-that regulators generally pursue their
private interests and those of important constituents, and that regulators' primary goal
is to augment their regulatory authority by maximizing the number of firms and
transactions under their purview. In addition, I assume away any problems on the
demand side. For purposes of my discussion, I assume that firm managers are
sufficiently motivated to seek regulation that maximizes firm value and that equity
and debt markets can efficiently price regulatory regimes." My interest is in the supply
side, in the role of private interests in affecting regulatory competition.
I. DIRECT COMPETITION AND CHOICE OF LAW HARMONIZATION
Corporate charter competition in the US probably offers the best example of
direct competition, regulatory competition in its pure form. Each state offers its own
corporation law, and the states share a choice of law rule-the so-called internal
affairs rule-that enables competition among them. Under the internal affairs rule, a
firm may incorporate under the corporation law of any state, and as to its internal
affairs-the relations among the firm's shareholders and managers-the firm's chosen
law will be respected by all the states, regardless of the location of the firm's
headquarters, assets, or personnel, and regardless of where particular transactions
occur or particular persons reside.9 The ability of corporations to operate nationwide
under the state corporate law of their choosing in effect creates a common market for
corporate law, with states acting as producers competing nationwide for consumers of
corporate law. Because states may garner significant fees with successful sales of
corporate charters, as well as benefit local constituents, they have some incentive to
7. See Romano, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L at 393 (cited in note 2) ("[Rlegulators prefer to have within
their jurisdiction more rather than fewer regulated firms and transactions.").
8. Compare James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 Colum L Rev 1200, 1234
(1999) (questioning whether securities markets can efficiently price differences among regulatory
regimes).
9. A handful of states-California and New York most notably-impose their own local requirements
on certain foreign corporations as to certain issues. See Cal Corp Code § 2115 (West 1990); NY
Bus Corp Law § 1320 (McKinney 1986).
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offer corporate law that firm managers and investors prefer. According to advocates of
regulatory competition, this competition among states produces corporate law that
maximizes firm values and investor returns.1
While scholars debate the merits of US corporate charter competition," some
also rely on it as a model for international regulatory competition, both in corporate
law 12 and in areas related to corporate law, namely securities regulation" and
bankruptcy. 4 However, in making this move from competition among US states over
corporate law to global or regional regulatory competition among nations, proponents
have paid insufficient attention to the choice of law cooperation among US states that
enables US corporate charter competition. The internal affairs rule is a critical
component in enabling competition for corporate charters. That an appropriate
choice of law convention could emerge among US states in a federal system does not
necessarily suggest the same dynamics will occur among nations. Not that they could
not, but they have not, and there may be good reason to think they will not.
In order for competition to occur in similar form internationally, nation-states
would have to harmonize their choice of law rules, agreeing to honor firms' private
choices regarding applicable corporate, securities, or bankruptcy law. Considerations
of international political economy suggest that obstacles exist to the achievement of
the required harmonization. In particular, regulators and other private interests may
have significant stakes in the territorial monopolies that comprise the status quo.
Their influence may be sufficient to block the required choice of law cooperation.
10. See Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 14-51 (AEI 1993).
11. Compare id; Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
212-27 (Harvard 1991), with Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv L Rev 1435 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and
Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: Tle Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 Colum L
Rev 1168 (1999); Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 Cornell L Rev 1205 (2001); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 Colum L Rev 1908 (1998).
12. See Joseph A. McCahery and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The Evolution of Closely Held Business Forms in
Europe, 26 J Corp L 855 (2001) (discussing prospects for US-style regulatory competition over
smaller business forms within EU). See also Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus
Harmonization in European Company Law, in Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, eds, Regulatory
Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives 190 (Oxford 2001) (discussing prospects
for US-style corporate charter competition in EU).
13. See Choi and Guzman, 71 S Cal L Rev at 936 (cited in note 4); Romano, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L
387 (cited in note 2). See also Romano, 107 Yale LJ at 2359 (cited in note 5) (arguing that issuer of
securities in the US should be able to choose securities regulatory regime from among the federal
regime and those of the fifty US states, and that choice set for foreign issuer should also include its
home country regime).
14. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 Mich J Intl L 1 (1997);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 Mich L Rev
2252 (2000).
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Regulators' assumed incentives-the desire to augment their regulatory
authority-would theoretically drive them to compete over substantive rules in the
face of direct competition. But those same incentives would likely also drive them to
resist competition in the first place. Regulators and their important constituents are
likely to offer significant resistance to any attempt to create competitive regulatory
markets. For a given area of regulation, within each country private interests are likely
to exist that have a strong stake in maintaining territorial regulation. These private
interests may enjoy increasing returns from their mastery of the regulatory regime at
issue. Especially when a regulatory bureaucracy exists whose sole purpose is to
administer the regulation, that bureaucracy is likely to be an effective opponent of
choice of law harmonization that would enable firms' easy exit. The bureaucracy and
its constituents are likely to be well organized, with high per capita stakes in opposing
competition.'5
For instance, securities regulatory commissions exist in most industrial countries
with active securities markets. National securities regulators would be unlikely to
support any policy that might impinge on their regulatory monopolies. If regulators
care about bureaucratic aggrandizement, they would certainly oppose rules enabling
firms' easy exit from their regulatory purview. Securities lawyers and securities
industry professionals as well would likely have large stakes in maintaining territorial
regulation. A US securities lawyer's expertise will be in US securities regulation. A
Japanese securities lawyer will be an expert in her local regulatory regime. Each will be
territorially bound. As with regulators, their interests will generally be in preserving
the value of their territorial expertise, which may diminish in value with competition
driven by private choice.
With company law, the EU has been at the center of scholarly focus in terms of
the potential for the development of direct competition, especially after the Centros
decision of the European Court of Justice.6 But even optimistic analysts concede that
professionals interested in the status quo may offer formidable resistance to reforms
that threaten their livelihoods.
7
In bankruptcy as well, both government and private actors may have significant
nondiversifiable human capital investments in local regulation. In the US, for
15. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Schocken
1965). Consider George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3
(1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19J L & Econ 211 (1976).
16. Case C-212197, Centros Ltd v Erbvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECR 1-1459, [1999] CMLR 551
(1999). See McCahery and Vermeulen, 26 J Corp L 855 (cited in note 12); Deakin, Regulatory
Competition versus Harmonization (cited in note 12); Werner F. Ebke, Centros-Some Realities and Some
Mysteries, 48 AmJ Comp L 623 (2000).
17. See McCahery and Vermeulen, 26 J Corp L at 876 (cited in note 12) (discussing influence of
notaries-lawyers specially qualified for incorporations, with a "well-entrenched position and
proximity to the lawmaking process"-in blocking emergence of new business forms).
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any harmonized company law that eliminates their participation, 20 and they would no
doubt oppose private choice as well, which would allow German firms to opt out of
the local company law that guaranties labor participation. Similarly, employees in
France, Mexico, and South Korea enjoy priority in bankruptcy for their claims for
unpaid prebankruptcy wages. These wage claims are senior to the claims of secured
creditors.2' The existence of this bankruptcy priority suggests that labor interests in
these countries might also enjoy political clout sufficient to resist any choice of law
reform that would imperil it. While such distributional benefits of local law may or
may not offer sufficient stakes to galvanize beneficiaries-in these examples, labor
interests-to actively oppose private choice on their own, at the very least, they would
provide allies for territorially bound regulatory experts intent on preserving the worth
of their human capital.
What about corporate charter competition in the US? Why did private interests
not frustrate the widespread acceptance of the internal affairs rule that enables
competition among US states? Analysts disagree as to the relative importance of
constitutional influences on the evolution of the internal affairs rule and the national
market for corporate law.' However, even on the most decentralized, bottom-up view
of things-that each state unilaterally and independently arrived at the internal affairs
rule-constitutional guarantees of unimpeded interstate commerce played a critical
role. According to this view, without state-by-state trade barriers, firms could
generally avoid unattractive corporate law by simply moving out of an unattractive
jurisdiction, while continuing to sell products into the unfriendly jurisdiction.' This
relatively easy exit option meant that a state had little to gain and something to lose-
in terms of local tax base, business opportunities, employment, and other positive
spillovers-by attempting to impose local corporate law in the face of a firm's election
of another state's law. Therefore, local interests would have favored local recognition
of out-of-state incorporation, supporting the internal affairs rule and precluding the
20. See Deakin, Regulatory Competition versus Harmonization at 190 (cited in note 12).
21. See Soogeun Oh, Creditor Rights in Insolvency Procedure 2, prepared for presentation at Insolvency
Systems in Asia: An Efficiency Perspective, OECD conference, Sydney, Australia (Nov 29-30, 1999),
available online at <http://www.oecd.org/pdf/MO00015000/M0015678.pdf> (visited Sept 15,
2002) (concerning South Korea); American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency Project-
International Statement of Mexican Bankruptcy Law 71 (tentative draft Apr 15, 1998) (concerning
Mexico); Philip R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency 24 (Sweet & Maxwell 1995)
(concerning France).
22. See Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in F.H. Buckley,
ed, Ile Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract 325, 333 (Duke 1999).
23. Territorial application of local corporate law typically involves rules to protect local investors, and
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is typically based on the predominance of firm assets, employees,
sales, income, or investors in the prescribing jurisdiction. See Cal Corp Code § 2115; NY Bus Corp
Law § 1320.
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example, a separate bankruptcy court system exists-employing hundreds of
bankruptcy judges, trustees, and court personnel-to administer US bankruptcy
proceedings. Public company debtors and creditors employ legions of lawyers,
accountants, investment bankers, and other consultants in order to navigate the US
corporate bankruptcy process. The stock in trade of this bankruptcy "industry" is its
expertise in the US system. If local firms were free to exit by selecting the bankruptcy
regime of another jurisdiction, the local bankruptcy industry would suffer.
The government and private actors who deal in local regulatory expertise are
likely to be powerful interest groups in each country. They will be concentrated, well
organized, and well financed. Especially with the perceived complexity of securities
regulation and bankruptcy law, regulators and administrators are likely to enjoy
significant information advantages over legislators and are likely to wield significant
influence with respect to any major reform proposals that affect their interests.' s By
contrast, while firm managers and investors might appreciate the value-enhancing
effects of private choice, their personal interests in private choice are not likely to be as
concentrated as the interests of prospective opponents of direct competition. Firm
managers have survived under the status quo in which they find themselves. Their
livelihoods will not generally depend on securing new latitude to opt out of their local
corporate, securities, or bankruptcy law. Firm managers may have personal stakes in
particular aspects of regulation, namely, those provisions that affect the stability of
their managerial positions. 9 However, their willingness to dedicate resources and
attention to securing private choice harmonization is unlikely to match that of its
opponents to defeating it. Anticipating this mismatch, putative beneficiaries of private
choice harmonization are unlikely to initiate efforts toward that goal.
Particular interest groups may also have specific stakes in the distributional
consequences of local law. Labor groups in Germany, for example, enjoy
representation on the supervisory boards of public companies. This "co-
determination" system has no counterpart under UK company law, and this critical
difference between German and UK company law has been a significant impediment
in the formulation of an EU company law. German labor organizations have opposed
18. See William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government 30 (Aldine 1971)
("Although the nominal relationship of a bureau and its sponsor is that of a bilateral monopoly, the
relative incentives and available information, under most conditions, give the bureau the
overwhelmingly dominant monopoly power."); Bruce G. Carruthers and Terence C. Halliday,
Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States 74
(Clarendon 1998) (describing conditions for "professional dominance" in financial lawmaking).
19. We would expect, for example, to see firm managers lobby in favor of rules facilitating takeover
defenses and inhibiting tender offers. See Bebchuk and Ferrell, 99 Colum L Rev at 1168 (cited in
note 11); David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model,
with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J L & Econ 311 (1987) (offering public choice
explanation for insider trading rules, including firm managers' influence in obtaining passage of Rule
14e-3 to inhibit arbitrageurs from aiding hostile tender offers).
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formation of interest groups favoring territoriality in corporate law.24 On this view,
put simply, the threat of firms' physical exit to avoid a state's undesirable corporate
law forced each state to offer virtual exit-avoidance of the unattractive local law
without the need for physical exit-through adoption of the internal affairs rule.'
Interstate commerce and relations among states in a federal system are quite
different from relations among independent nations. Within each independent
nation, national regulation of firm-investor relations, combined with the historical
difficulties of firms' physical exit from their home jurisdictions, would not surprisingly
produce interest groups with stakes in territorial regulation. These interest groups will
wish to preserve regulatory monopolies, making direct competition unlikely. The
history of the US states is decidedly different.
II. REGULATORY PASSPORT SYSTEMS
The difficulties for direct competition described above do not mean that nations
will not compete in terms of regulation. However, the competition is likely to take
more indirect forms. One scenario that we already observe and that has generated
scholarly commentary is the "regulatory passport" arrangement, which is essentially
organized extraterritoriality.6 Nations agree under this sort of arrangement that in a
particular area of regulation, and under given conditions, a firm from Country A
engaging in a transaction in Country B will come under the regulatory regime, not of
Country B-as traditional territoriality would dictate-but of Country A, the firm's
home country.z The Country A firm in effect carries a "regulatory passport" from its
home country, allowing it to transact in host Country B while remaining under the
regulatory purview of its home country. The firm's home country regulatory regime
"travels" with the firm with respect to its activities in the host country.
In this part, I first describe in ideal terms the basic structure and competitive
promise of the regulatory passport arrangement. I then discuss the role that private
interests and other factors may play in shaping passport arrangements so as to blunt
24. See Kobayashi and Ribstein, Contract and jurisdictional Freedom at 333 (cited in note 22); William J.
Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26J Legal Stud 303, 312 (1997).
25. States' other obvious alternative-reforming the unattractive aspects of their corporate laws-has
apparently also been pursued. Scholars have noted the substantial uniformity across states' corporate
law statutes. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product. Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J L,
Econ, & Org 225, 235 (1985); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial.': A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw U L Rev 542,588-89 (1990).
26. Others have also used the "passport" metaphor. See Jackson and Pan, 56 Bus Law at 662 (cited in
note 4) (describing EU securities regulatory scheme of mutual recognition as "passport" system).
This regulatory arrangement has also been referred to as "mutual recognition," see Scott, 63 L &
Contemp Probs at 80 (cited in note 4), and "normal reciprocity," see Choi and Guzman, 71 S Cal L
Rev at 918 (cited in note 4).
27. "Home country" is generally understood to mean thejurisdicrion in which the firm's headquarters or
principal place of business is located.
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firm mobility and competitive pressure on regulators. Finally, I compare the
regulatory passport system to direct competition as a structure for inducing
competition. The regulatory passport offers firms some flexibility, and while it bears
some family resemblance to direct competition, a closer look shows that benefits to
firms-and competitive pressure on regulators-are likely to be decidedly narrower
than under direct competition.
A. COMPETITIVE PROMISE
To take a simple two-country example from securities regulation, the postulated
benefit to firms from a two-country passport arrangement is that each firm in both
countries has only to comply with its own domestic regulatory regime-plus some
harmonized rules-in order to be able to sell securities in both jurisdictions. Firms in
each country are relieved from having to comply with the territorial regulation that
would otherwise apply when issuing securities in their non-home country. A firm in
effect relies on its regulatory passport to "exit" from the host country regulatory
regime while engaging in economic activity there.
Examples of regulatory passport arrangements include (a) the Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System ("MJDS") between the US and Canada with respect to securities
offerings;' and (b) two related EU directives on securities offerings: the newly
adopted EU Listing Particulars Directive (the "New LPD"),' pursuant to which an
issuer with securities listed on its home country exchange may list as well on the
exchanges of other member states without full compliance with the listing
requirements of those other exchanges; and the EU Public Offers Directive
("POD"),' ° under which a firm's home country public offering documents may be used
to make a public offering in other member states. In addition, universalism in
bankruptcy, an arrangement that has been popular with scholars but not with
28. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting
System for Canadian Issuers, 56 Fed Reg 30036 (1991) (hereinafter SEC MJDS Release); Notice of
National Policy Statement No 45, 14 OSC Bull 2844 (1991) (hereinafter CSA MJDS Policy
Statement).
29. The complete title is Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28
May 2001 on the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing and on Information to
be Published on Those Securities. See Council Directive 2001/34/EC, 2001 OJ (L 184) 1 (repealing
Council Directive 79/279/EEC, 1979 OJ (L 66) 21; Council Directive 80/390/EEC, 1980 OJ (L
100) 1; Council Directive 82/148/EEC, 1982 OJ (L 62) 22; Council Directive 87/345/EEC, 1987
OJ (L 185) 81; Council Directive 88/627/EEC, 1988 0J (L 348) 62; Council Directive
90/211/EEC, 1990 OJ (L 112) 24; Council Directive 94/18/EC, 1994 OJ (L 135) 1).
30. Council Directive 89/298/EEC, 1989 OJ (L 124) 8. See also Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, 2001/280 final-2001/0117(COD), 2001 OJ (C
240 E) 272 (proposing to supersede Council Directive 89/298/EEC).
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lawmakers in any nation,3 has a similar structure. Under universalism, the bankruptcy
regime of the debtor's home country would govern the disposition of the debtor's
assets on a worldwide basis, displacing the traditional territorial jurisdiction of the
various states in which those assets are located. Regulatory passports are a staple of
EU regulatory coordination in other areas as well. The Investment Services Directive
("ISD"), for example, which addresses the activities and regulation of investment firms
throughout the EU, establishes a passport arrangement.32 While not directly related
to firm-investor relations, ISD has had significant effects on securities market
structure within the EU.3
Regulatory passport arrangements involve competition and harmonization, but
in a different relationship from the direct competition scenario described in part I
above. Direct competition involves harmonization of choice of law rules honoring
firms' private choice of regulatory regime. By contrast, with regulatory passport
systems, harmonization typically occurs along a substantive dimension, as well as with
respect to the choice of law rule honoring home country regulation. Agreement to
honor the home country's extraterritorial regulation is typically conditioned on
harmonization of minimum substantive standards. Countries negotiate to harmonize
certain substantive rules deemed fundamental in an area of regulation. These shared
substantive rules form a common baseline among participating countries, beyond
which each country is free to deviate. Provided that the particular cross-border
transaction complies with the agreed baseline regulations, participating nations agree
to honor the extraterritorial reach of the home country's regulatory regime, which
displaces the host country's territorial regulation.
The New LPD, for example, describes EU issuers' baseline disclosure
requirements in order to be able to list with a foreign (non-home country) exchange in
another member state. The directive itemizes the various types of information
required, including identification of the parties responsible for preparing the listing
particulars and auditing the financial statements; the issuer's capitalization; its
principal business activities; certain financial information; information concerning the
issuer's management; and the issuer's prospects. 4 Likewise, MJDS enables qualifying
Canadian firms to issue equity and investment-grade debt securities in the US3-and
31. See Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 Mich J Intl L 31 (2001) (applying simple
game-theoretic analysis to show political infeasibility of universalism).
32. Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 1993 OJ (L 141).
33. Consider Guido Ferrarini, ed, European Securities Markets: The Investment Services Directive and Beyond
(Kluwer 1998). One effect of ISD has been to enable brokerage firms to gain membership and access
to foreign stock exchanges, thereby allowing investors to make cross-border investments through
their local brokers. Investors' easy access to foreign exchanges has reduced the need for issuers to
pursue foreign investors through cross-listings. See Jackson and Pan, 56 Bus Law at 677 (cited in
note 4).
34. See New LPD at Annex I (cited in note 29).
35. See SEC MJDS Release (cited in note 28).
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qualifying US firms to issue such securities in Canada-provided they comply with
(a) the securities laws of their home country and (b) certain harmonized minimum
standards.'
In terms of competitive effects, a passport arrangement ideally puts pressure on
national regulators to offer efficient legal rules. Returning to our two-country
securities regulation example, assume that firms from both countries sell their
securities into the two-country market. From the perspective of Country A regulators,
competitive pressures arise from two sources. First, Country B firms may opt out of
unattractive Country A regulation when issuing securities in Country A. The
regulatory passport enables Country B firms' figurative exit from the local regulatory
regime through compliance with their home country rules. Country A regulators,
anxious to maximize the number of firms and volume of transactions under their
regulatory purview, may modify their rules to entice foreign-Country B-firms to
choose local regulation over home country rules. 8
In addition, juxtaposing two regulatory regimes in a common capital or product
market may generate political pressure on national regulators. To the extent Country
A's rules are suboptimal, firms from Country A will find themselves at a competitive
disadvantage relative to Country B's firms in terms of capital raising in the common
capital market. The disadvantaged Country A firms may then seek relief from their
home Country A regulators. According to conventional wisdom, placing the two
regulatory regimes side by side, as it were, highlights the inefficiencies in each regime,
creating political pressure on regulators and forcing them to come to the aid of their
own firms by remedying problematic rules.39
The following sections take a closer look at these promised benefits from
regulatory passports.
B. PROMISES REEXAMINED: EXIT BY FOREIGN FIRMS
Foreign firms' exit options-and competitive effects on host country
regulators-may often be less significant than the preceding stylized account
36. See CSA MJDS Policy Statement (cited in note 28).
37. In the case of MJDS, these harmonized minimum standards evolved informally, as Canadian
regulators adopted disclosure standards similar to US standards over the course of the negotiation
over MJDS. See Uri Geiger, Harmnonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market-A
Proposal, 66 Fordham L Rev 1785, 1792 (1998).
38. See Jackson and Pan, 56 Bus Law at 663 (cited in note 4) (describing governmental responsiveness
with EU Listing Particulars Directive and Public Offers Directive).
39. See Scott, 63 L & Contemp Probs at 85 (cited in note 4) (noting that both MJDS and EU POD
passport systems create "a basic inequity for domestic issuers," who could be expected to lobby home
country regulators for relief) ("Indeed, in the European Union, it was widely believed and accepted
that the home-country approach would shortly lead to convergence of disclosure standards (to some
optimal level) as domestic issuers pressured governments to change local rules.").
O0. 3 NO. 2
Tassports, Private CIoice, and Private Interests
promises. To continue with our securities regulation example, consider one plausible
scenario. Call one country HD for "high disclosure," and the other LD for "low
disclosure,'" ° which characterizes the stringency of their national disclosure regimes
for issuing securities. A regulatory passport enables an LD firm to issue securities in
HD without incurring the costs of full blown compliance with HD's high disclosure
requirements. However, the HD firm may enjoy no corresponding benefit from the
passport system when issuing in LD. Because its home country rules are more
stringent than in LD, when the HD firm goes to issue securities in LD, it is no better
off than under territoriality. It prefers the less stringent LD rules when issuing in LD,
and the passport system has not reduced its regulatory burden.4' The HD firm must
comply with its more stringent home country rules in any event.42 In turn, because
HD firms have no reason to exit LD's territorial regulation when issuing in LD, the
passport arrangement has generated no competitive pressure on LD regulators to
improve the efficiency of their rules.
In the other direction, for LD firms issuing in HD, even LD firms' exit option
from HD regulation may be limited. If the disparity between HD and LD rules is
large, HD regulators may attempt to reduce that disparity in the original negotiation
over the harmonized rules of the passport system. Regulators in HD have private
incentives to reduce politically sensitive differences by requiring certain of HD's
40. These could be the US and Canada, respectively, or the UK and Spain.
41. The HD firm might be better off leaving its HD passport at home and simply complying with LD's
more lax rules. As a practical matter, however, having already incurred the costs of complying with
HD's high disclosure rules, the HD firm might as well make the same information easily available in
LD, if it is not already available by virtue of the firm's existing disclosures in HD. The lion's share of
disclosure costs is more likely to be in the gathering and assembling of the information, rather than
in the distributing to investors. And disclosure in LD in excess of LD's legal requirements might
lower the firm's capital costs in LD by enticing investors to pay more for the firm's securities than
they would without the information.
42. Firms typically issue and list securities in their home countries first, thereby subjecting them to the
securities laws of their home countries. This makes sense. A firm's capital costs are likely to be
lowest in its home country, since investors in the home country are likely to enjoy informational
advantages over foreign investors with respect to assessing the firm's value and prospects. See
Romano, 107 Yale L J at 2397 (cited in note 5) ("Resort solely to foreign capital markets for
financing is not a viable option for publicly traded US firms."); Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy
of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 Mich L Rev 696, 770-71
(1998) ("Despite the burden of compliance, avoiding the U.S. market traditionally has not made
sense for U.S. issuers since the United States is the residence of a large portion of their most likely
potential investors."). Under the New LPD, a firm could choose a regulatory regime other than that
of its home state by making its initial offering in another member state. But "[un reality, very few
issuers apparently choose to list outside of their home country given that issuers often find the
warmest reception for their securities in their home markers."Jackson and Pan, 56 Bus Law at 679 n
70 (cited in note 4). This may not be universally true, however, if other aspects of the local market
make it unattractive for local firms. See Amir N. Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing.
So,,e Direct Evidence, 22 U Pa J Intl Econ L 325, 336 (2001) (describing Israeli firms' strategy of
raising capital in US, bypassing Israeli market and its regulatory burdens).
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higher standards as part of the harmonized rules. This may preserve some authority
for HD regulators by creating a policing function with respect to LD firms'
compliance with the harmonized rules. In addition, forcing LD firms to meet certain
important requirements on par with HD firms reduces possible political pressure
from HD firms to lower HD regulatory standards. MJDS offers one example of this
phenomenon of a regulatory passport arrangement that includes significant
harmonization.43
Finally, even though the LD firm offering securities in HD would have no legal
obligation to disclose more than required under its home country rules plus the
harmonized rules, market forces may force higher disclosure. Investors in HD may
demand from LD firms the same high disclosure they enjoy from HD firms.' If so,
the LD passport has not reduced disclosure requirements for LD firms issuing in HD,
and has generated no competitive pressure on HD regulators.
In our simple example, then, the passport arrangement offers HD firms no
useful exit option from host country regulation, and possibly limited exit for LD
firms. Competitive pressure on host country regulators is correspondingly blunted. Of
course, not all passport arrangements will involve regulatory asymmetries among
states such that firm exit matters in only one direction. Likewise, harmonized
standards will not always erase differences across regulatory regimes so as to minimize
the value of the passport. However, these phenomena do suggest that passport
arrangements may not always offer much firm mobility or competitive pressure on
host country regulators, as the stylized account might otherwise suggest.
C. PROMISES REEXAMINED: EXIT AND VOICE BY HOME COUNTRY
FIRMS
What about competitive pressure on home country regulators? In this section, I
discuss the behavior of home country firms under regulatory passport arrangements
43. Some have claimed that MJDS hardly effects mutual recognition but instead institutionalizes the
Americanization of Canadian securities law. Not only has most of the "harmonization" involved
simply Canadian adoption of US standards, see Geiger, 66 Fordham L Rev at 1793 (cited in note
37), but even more importantly, MJDS affects only disclosure standards, not liability rules.
Canadian offerings in the US are still subject to US civil liability rules, thus forcing some
convergence of Canadian prospectuses to the US "look," as well as driving due diligence practices
toward US conventions. See Cally Jordan, Regulation of Canadian Capital Markets in the 1990s: The
United States in the Driver's Seat, 4 Pac Rim L & PolJ 577, 591 (1995).
44. HD investors may severely discount the prices they are willing to pay for securities of LD firms that
are not accompanied by high disclosure. So LD firms may lower their overall costs of capital by
voluntarily disclosing at a higher level. Some evidence of this phenomenon exists in the EU, as
"International-style Offerings" routinely include disclosures in excess of formal legal requirements.
See Jackson and Pan, 56 Bus Law 685-86 (cited in note 4) (noting influence of US and UK
disclosure standards on disclosures to institutional investors as part of International-style
Offerings).
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and the prospects of such behavior for generating competitive pressures on their
national regulators. As part of this discussion, I contrast passports with direct
competition. Even with a best case passport system, competitive pressures on home
country regulators may be relatively weak. The basic shortcoming of a passport
arrangement is that unlike direct competition, it does not allow for firms' easy exit
from home country regulation. While regulatory passports might offer firms some
flexibility with respect to their activities in host countries, firms remain tied to home
country regulation.
1. Exit
For home country firms under a passport system, the home country regulatory
regime is much like any other home country factor endowment that may affect a firm's
cost structure-like transportation infrastructure or energy resources, for example.
Regulation is similar to these other factor endowments insofar as they all "come with
the territory." A firm is stuck with these factor endowments unless it physically exits
the territory. The HD firm cannot escape unattractive HD regulation unless it
relocates.
When physical exit is not easy or cheap, home country regulators may have no
strong incentives to provide optimal rules. To the extent suboptimal home country
regulation imposes costs on firms, it makes their capital more expensive and their
products less competitive. On the other hand, other territorial endowments may be
especially attractive, so that firms may be willing to endure suboptimal law while
enjoying a country's well-developed capital market or telecommunications
infrastructure, for example. In those situations, regulators may enjoy some slack in
terms of not being pressed to offer optimal regulation, since firms will not exit.
This is not to say that regulatory exit is entirely unavailable. With securities
regulation, for example, a firm with headquarters and significant operations in HD
could theoretically escape HD regulation by simply offering securities only outside of
HD. This approach is exceedingly rare, however. 5 A firm could also move from HD
to LD in order to have LD's less stringent regime govern its offerings in both
countries. However, firms are not generally so mobile. They have headquarters and
key operations, employees, relationships, goodwill, and assets that are not readily
transplanted without significant loss of value. The same goes for corporate law.
Similar considerations would impede firms' exit from company law regimes based on
territorial notions of si ge rel,46 principal place of business, or firm headquarters.'
45. See note 42 and accompanying text.
46. A number of EU member states, Germany and France among them, espouse a "real seat" rule for
corporations, under which the location of a firm's principal place of business determines the
applicable company law. See Ebke, 48 AmJ Comp L at 624-25 (cited in note 16).
47. With bankruptcy, the question of exit from home country rules is a bit more complicated because of
endgame issues. Physical exit from the home country may be as cumbersome and costly as described
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By contrast, a private choice, direct competition system would create a common
market for law. In our securities law example with HD and LD, all firms of both
countries could choose the regulatory system of either nation to govern their securities
activity in both jurisdictions. HD firms could choose LD regulation even when issuing
in HD. And with multiple nations involved in a private choice arrangement, firms
would enjoy even wider options. In particular, the HD firm would not be limited to
the home or host country in its choice of regulation. It could select the law of a third
country that would entitle it to issue securities in HD and LD, as well as in every other
country in the system. HD firms could easily exit from the stringent HD regime, and
they would have multiple options in terms of regulatory regime. This arrangement
would in effect allow each jurisdiction to sell "passports" to "citizens" of other
jurisdictions, placing each jurisdiction in direct competition with others in a market
for passports.
Moreover, including additional states in a private choice arrangement increases
not only the number of options for firms but also the size of the common market for
law. As this common market grows, so do the potential spoils available from
successful sales of regulation. Regulators' incentives to compete may therefore increase
with the addition of states and the increasing size of the market.
By contrast, a regulatory passport arrangement among multiple nations is more
like a set of separate bilateral recognition agreements, linked possibly by some
common harmonized rules. Adding a state to this system gives each firm an additional
jurisdiction in which to travel with its home country passport. As in the simple two-
country case, however, a firm venturing outside its home country still only has the
simple-and perhaps not very meaningful-choice of home or host country rules. On
the other hand, one competition enhancing effect of adding states is that it makes
physical exit marginally more attractive. Physical relocation to the state in the system
with the "best" regulation, while still costly, becomes more attractive the larger the
passport system gets, because the "market opening" effect of the "best" passport
becomes more valuable to more firms. In this way, adding states to a passport system
may create marginally more competition among regulators. This effect, of course, may
above with respect to securities regulation and company law. However, if a firm is insolvent,
managers are spending the creditors' money, not equity holders'. Therefore, the financial and
operational costs of exit may not deter firms' eleventh-hour exit. In other words, physical exit may be
too easy. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84
Cornell L Rev 696, 722 (1999) (discussing debtor firms' eve-of-bankruptcy law- and forum-
shopping). This manipulability of the home country choice of law rule may explain why
universalism-essentially a proposal for a regulatory passport arrangement for international
bankruptcy-has found no concrete policy enactments. The indeterminacy of the "home country"
choice of law rule may deter states from committing to such an arrangement. See Tung, 23 Mich J
Intl L at 75 (cited in note 31) (describing how indeterminacy in home country standard frustrates
states' reciprocity strategies).
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be blunted to the extent the value of the "best" passport is diminished by strategic
harmonization and the other factors earlier discussed.
Ultimately with passport arrangements, no common market for law exists from
which consumers might freely choose the legal product that best meets their needs.
Absent the possibility of physical exit by firms, national regulators are not forced to
compete with each other for consumers across the market. Instead, each national
regulator enjoys a territorial monopoly with respect to home country firms. What
makes the "passport" metaphor especially apt is that, as with real passports, firms in a
regulatory passport system can only obtain passports from their home countries.
While the passport allows the firm to travel with its home country regulatory regime,
it does nothing to enable the firm's exit from that regime. Instead, it preserves the
territorial regulatory monopolies at the heart of the complaint of regulatory
competition advocates.48 In fact, with comfortable monopolies preserved,49 regulators
may also feel little urgency to compete for foreign firms traveling on their passports.
2. Voice
To be sure, even if exit is unlikely, this is not to say that political pressure may
not force regulators to streamline regulation. Firms unable to exit their home
jurisdictions may instead turn to political action to spur regulatory reform." Passport
arrangements might facilitate political action by highlighting particularly galling
regulatory burdens imposed by home country rules. Home country firms and foreign
firms may be subject to wildly disparate rules while engaged in the same activity in the
home country, assuming such disparities were not eliminated in the structuring of the
harmonized rules. HD firms in our previous example may find themselves
disadvantaged vis-a-vis their counterparts from LD, who may raise capital in HD at
lower cost. A stark disparity may make it difficult for HD regulators to resist
demands of HD firms to lower regulatory burdens to lessen or eliminate the disparity.
On the other hand, even if stark or politically charged disparities existed,
lobbying would be worthwhile only if coalition costs for HD firms were lower than
the costs of the disparate regulations. The potential return on political investments by
HD firms-in effect the potential cost savings from elimination of disparate
regulatory burdens-would also have to be discounted by the possibility that their
lobbying efforts might come to naught. Other more concentrated interests may have a
48. In fact, the scope of the home country regulator's monopoly over home country firms expands under
a passport system as compared to territoriality. See part III.
49. Not all monopolies are equally comfortable, of course. The SEC's monopoly over US issuers is
much more stable than the Israeli Securities Agency's over its local firms. See Licht, 22 U PaJ Ind
Econ L at 325 (cited in note 42).
50. On the inverse relation between exit and voice, see Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Harvard 1970).
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greater stake in defending high disclosure for HD firms,"' so that political action by
HD firms would be deterred. In the US, for example, foreign issuers enjoy lower
securities regulatory burdens in certain areas than domestic issuers, 2 and to date,
domestic issuers seem not to have been willing to organize against these disparities.
Finally, even if political pressure demanded the elimination of disparities as
between HD and LD rules, there is no a priori reason to believe the result would be
less regulation, the desired outcome for regulatory competition proponents. Regulators
from HD and LD would no doubt have an important if not leading role in any
negotiation over harmonization of their disparate rules. Lowering HD regulatory
requirements to match LD's would diminish HD regulators' prestige and importance,
a move that HD regulators would likely resist. On the other hand, raising LD
regulatory requirements to match HD's might augment the prestige of LD's
regulatory bureaucracy. So regulators may have some stake in upward harmonization,
and this may also satisfy HD firms' demand for regulatory parity.
In any event, competitive pressures on regulators under regulatory passport
systems seem a far cry from the private choice, direct competition model. Given the
mobility of firms that characterizes US corporate charter competition, a market exists
in which corporate law is the product. 3 Not so for regulatory passport systems.
Though firms may enjoy some limited reprieve from host country regulation by
relying on their home country passports, the strong tie to home country regulation
remains, and with it, home country regulators' monopolies.
III. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY PASSPORTS
Under a regulatory passport system, then, vigorous competition among
regulators to offer optimal regulation seems much less likely than under direct
51. Some have argued, for example, that in the US, it is the lawyers, accountants, and securities
professionals who most benefit from mandatory disclosure. Their combined influence makes
deregulation unlikely.
The prospects for substantial cost-reducing modification in our corporate disclosure
system are [ ] slim when viewed from the perspective of the economics of regulation. Two
relatively small, well-organized groups have strong and understandable interests in seeing
that the SEC corporate system is preserved and expanded, namely, professionals who
produce the disclosure documents and who receive them free.
Susan M. Phillips andJ. Richard Zecher, The SEC and tbe Public Interest 51 (MIT 1981).
52. Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 Colum Bus L Rev 1, 44-54
(1999) (enumerating various reduced regulatory hurdles for foreign issuers); Jackson and Pan, 56
Bus Law at 666 (cited in note 4) (same).
53. Whether this market is competitive or not is a separate issue that has generated much scholarly
debate. See note 11.
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competition. The foregoing discussion of the role of private interests and other factors
in blunting competitive effects of passport arrangements allows us now to speculate a
bit on why we observe regulatory passport systems implemented internationally, but
not direct competition. It may be that this absence of severe competitive pressure on
regulators explains the relative popularity of regulatory passports.
Direct competition imperils the private interests of regulators and their
important constituents. Passports may not. Far from forcing regulators to compete or
"go out of business," a passport system may preserve and actually enhance regulators'
positions and prestige. First of all, a passport system may extend the scope of
regulators' monopolies over their own local firms. Regulators are left to regulating
their own firms, not only at home but abroad as well. Passports facilitate more cross-
border activity by firms of each country. So while each national regulator forgoes
territorial regulation of foreign firms, its regulatory purview is still enhanced overall
because it extends to the increased international activity of its own firms. After
MJDS, the SEC's reach encompasses securities activities of US firms not only in the
US, but in Canada as well.' The same is true for the Canadian Securities
Administrators with respect to Canadian firms' activities in the US." Rather than
competing in a common market for law, regulators from various jurisdictions
essentially effect market sharing agreements through passport arrangements, carving
up regulatoryjurisdiction not along territorial lines but along home country lines.'
Besides retaining regulatory jurisdiction over home country firms, national
regulators in a passport system may also play a significant role when their country is
the host country. When foreign firms seek to engage in activities in the host country
relying on their passports, host country regulators must police compliance with the
harmonized baseline rules that are part of the passport system. For example,
54. See CSA MJDS Policy Statement (cited in note 28) (describing role of SEC in reviewing US
issuers' disclosure documents under MJDS).
55. See SEC MJDS Release (cited in note 28) (noting that Canadian issuer's disclosure documents
submitted under MJDS would generally only be subject to customary Canadian review); Scott, 63 L
& Contemp Probs at 85 (cited in note 4) ('The MJDS basically relies on Canada to monitor and
enforce compliance with initial and ongoing disclosure requirements."). A similar phenomenon occurs
under universalist bankruptcy. The bankruptcy law of the debtor firm's home country would apply
to decide disposition not only of local assets but all debtor assets worldwide. Judges and other
professionals expert in the bankruptcy law of their home country might therefore support
universalism more readily than they would support direct competition over bankruptcy law. The
former augments the reach and value of their expertise, while the latter may not. In other work, I
express skepticism that universalist bankruptcy could ever emerge. See Tung, 23 Mich J Intl L 31
(cited in note 31). The point here, however, is that reasons of political economy suggest that
universalism is more plausible than private choice in bankruptcy.
56. See Grard Hertig, Regulatory Competition for EU Financial Services, in Esry and Geradin, eds,
Regulatory Conpetition and Economic Integration at 234 (cited in note 12). ("[Mjainly due to the EU
requiring cooperation among regulators, the latter have developed strong ties across jurisdictions,
which facilitates cartel-like behavior.").
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European firms desiring to list securities throughout the EU must first meet the
baseline requirements of the New LPD, with compliance being policed by national
regulators in the various host countries. This host state policing function not only
further augments national regulators' bureaucratic powers, but may also allow
national regulators some leeway to interpret and apply the harmonized rules in a way
that benefits local constituents.57
Given these significant functions for national regulators under regulatory
passport systems, it is small wonder that regulators have been able to reach
international accommodation on these arrangements, but have made no similar
progress on the direct competition model. Public choice considerations also suggest
that in terms of trends, regulatory passports may signal not a move toward greater
competition, but toward greater harmonization. Especially for regulators from the
relatively more stringent jurisdictions, upward harmonization of standards may help
preserve these regulators' territorial authority by reducing the attractiveness to firms
of relocating to more lax jurisdictions.5 International negotiations are likely to be
complicated and technical affairs, placing national regulators at the center of
international reform that is to a great extent insulated from political accountability.59
The harmonized minimum standards that are already part of most passport systems
could easily expand to swallow whatever diversity remains in local regulation. Any
political pressure to eliminate disparities in rules applicable to home- versus host-
country firms may as easily result in more regulation rather than less.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have compared two approaches to international regulatory
coordination-direct competition and regulatory passport arrangements-and have
suggested a tradeoff between them. While conceptually direct competition may be a
more effective way to spur competition among regulators, for this very reason, it is
also less feasible politically. Regulators will not easily relinquish their territorial
monopolies to the whims of consumers. Regulatory passport arrangements are likely
to become more popular over time, as they seem to offer the alluring prospect of
sensible international coordination of national regulatory regimes. With respect to
firm-investor affairs, it seems at least plausible that the home country would be the
57. Compare Jackson and Pan, 56 Bus Law at 682 n 85 (cited in note 4) (discussing differing scope of
"professionals exempion"-required by POD-across member states).
58. For example, Jon Macey characterizes SEC efforts at international coordination of insider trading
enforcement as an attempt to preserve its own authority. See Colombatto and Macey, 18 Cardozo L
Rev 925 (cited in note 3).
59. See Paul Stephan, The Futility of Unication and Harmonization of International Commercial Law, 39 VaJ
Intl L 743 (1999) (describing work of international private legislatures).
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appropriate regulator. ° On the other hand, while passport arrangements present a
structure that promises competitive benefits, these may be frustrated by the influences
of private interests.
60. Compare Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95
Mich L Rev 2498 (1997) (describing issuer nationality approach to international securities
regulation).
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